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1 Introduction
The last decades have seen an unprecedented level of ﬁrm mobility, leaving governments
in a situation of intense inter-jurisdictional competition for real capital. It is widely be-
lieved that this competition was the main driving force behind the remarkable downward
trend in corporate tax rates that has accompanied the process of economic integration
between European countries since the 1980s (Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and Rincke,
2010).
Although the negative trend in corporate income taxes in Europe is a well known phe-
nomenon, there is a noteworthy facet that has so far been largely overlooked. As shown
in Figure 1, the average statutory tax rate of those western European countries located
geographically at the border to formerly communist eastern Europe (Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden) was substantially higher than the average
tax in western countries located farther away from eastern Europe throughout the 1980s.
Around 1990, this tax diﬀerential began to narrow signiﬁcantly, until it stabilized at a
level of just three to ﬁve percentage points after 1994.
Figure 1 about here
Although it seems natural to think of the breakdown of communism in eastern Europe
and the following integration of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the other transition
economies with western Europe as the driving force behind the adjustment of statutory
tax rates in those western European countries directly exposed to the integration shock,
the ultimate economic factors leading to the tax decline are far from obvious. In partic-
ular, as noted by Overesch and Rincke (2009), is does not seem that competition over
corporate income tax rates was driving the adjustment process, because the transition
countries had tax levels exceeding those in the western countries until 1994. Hence, the
downward adjustment of corporate tax levels in the border countries was achieved at a
time when the new competitors for FDI had not yet implemented competitive tax poli-
cies. This ﬁnding suggests to look for other determinants of the relative decrease in tax
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levels in countries located at the eastern edge of western Europe. Given the characteris-
tics of the transition countries at the beginning of the 1990s, it seems natural to think of
the tax adjustment in the border countries as a response to the sudden integration with
eastern Europe as a low-wage region.
Guided by the beforementioned example, the paper analyzes the role of labor cost dif-
ferentials in international competition for FDI. The key point for considering wage dif-
ferentials is straightforward: In a world of integrated capital markets, labor costs are
important determinants of ﬁrms’ location decisions, and governments competing for FDI
should take this into account when designing their tax policies.
The contribution of the study is twofold. First, using a framework similar to that in
Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999), we study the role of labor cost diﬀerentials in competition
for FDI. Our theoretical analysis reveals that if two governments compete for a mobile
ﬁrm, the high-wage country is willing to oﬀer a more favorable tax regime. From the
theoretical analysis emerges the prediction that high-wage countries should compensate
ﬁrms by setting lower corporate tax rates compared to low-wage countries.
In the second part of the paper, we devise an empirical test of the hypothesis derived
from the model, focusing on statutory corporate income tax rates as the key parameters
of international tax competition. To solve the evident identiﬁcation problem when re-
gressing corporate tax rates on wages, we exploit the exogenous variation in labor cost
diﬀerentials in western Europe induced by the sudden integration with eastern Europe
after 1989/90. The idea behind the identiﬁcation strategy is that, depending largely on
the geographical position of countries relative to eastern Europe, some countries in west-
ern Europe were more strongly aﬀected than others (in terms of the competitiveness of
their wage levels) by the integration of low-wage countries in eastern Europe. As long as
we use physical distance to deﬁne a composite competitor for each country, a country’s
labor cost relative to this competitor will therefore be characterized by variation over
time that can plausibly be treated as exogenous in a model of corporate tax setting.
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The paper adds to the literature on the determinants of corporate tax rates which has,
somewhat surprisingly, so far largely ignored the role of labor costs. Apart from Devereux
et al. (2008), strategic tax competition among countries has been analyzed by Davies and
Voget (2008) and Overesch and Rincke (2010),1 while Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005),
e.g., have considered the role of economic openness. Also related is Be´nassy-Que´re´ et
al. (2007), who have discussed the role of public infrastructure.
Our data cover a panel of western European countries over the period from 1982 to
2005 and relate statuory corporate income tax rates to two measures of labor costs: the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’s index of ”Hourly Compensation Costs” in manufactur-
ing, measuring labor costs relative to U.S. levels, and the ILO’s measure of unit labor
costs. Accounting for the endogeneity of the labor cost diﬀerential, a number of controls,
the impact of common shocks as well as unobserved heterogeneity among countries, the
empirical analysis provides strong evidence suggesting that countries with relatively high
labor costs tend to set lower corporate income tax rates. The estimated eﬀects are eco-
nomically signiﬁcant: If the compensation cost diﬀerential increases by one percent of
the current compensation cost in the U.S., ﬁrms are, on average, compensated by a 0.19
percentage point cut in the tax rate. A one-standard deviation increase in the compen-
sation cost diﬀerential thus triggers a 5.1 percentage point cut in taxes. If we take into
account diﬀerences in labor productivity, we ﬁnd similar eﬀects: A one-standard devia-
tion increase in the unit labor cost diﬀerential is estimated to decrease the statutory tax
rate by 7.3 to 7.5 percentage points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, Section 3 the evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
1There is a substantial body of empirical literature on tax competition using local data. See, e.g.,
Besley and Case (1995), Brett and Pinkse (2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Bu¨ttner (2001), and
Bordignon et al., 2003.
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2 Bidding for FDI: The role of wage diﬀerentials
Our model follows a strand of literature where countries compete for a ﬁxed, discrete
number of international ﬁrms with a lump-sum location tax/subsidy. Most closely related
are Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), who model competition
for a single ﬁrm, and Hauﬂer and Wooton (2010), who have recently extended the anal-
ysis to cover the case of competition for many ﬁrms. Other related theoretical work
includes Barros and Cabral (2000), who model diﬀering gains from FDI, and Ferrett and
Wooton (2010a), who examine the role of the ownership structure. While obviously not
mirroring the complex nature of the many features and traits of business taxation, this
class of models has the distinctive advantage of displaying the eﬀects at work in inter-
jurisdictional competition for capital in the clearest possible way while still maintaining
the main trade-oﬀs relevant to our argument.
Consider a mobile foreign entrant ﬁrm, f , and two countries, A and B, whose markets
are separated by unit transport costs τ . The entrant produces a homogeneous good,
x, in what is to become a monopolistic market.2 There are n identical households in
country A and 1 − n households in country B. A nume´raire good, z, is produced by
perfectly competitive ﬁrms in both countries, with labor being the only input. Trade in
z is assumed to be free, equalizing wages in the z-industry to w. In addition, units are
scaled such that one unit of labor generates one unit of output, ﬁxing the competitive
wage at unity. Household preferences are given by
ui = αxi − (1/2)βx2i + zi, i ∈ {A,B}, (1)
yielding linear demand functions for good x. Each household is assumed to inelastically
supply one unit of labor. Maximizing ui subject to the household budget constraint
2The absence of incumbent industry implies no loss of generality as long as incumbents would be
symmetrically dispersed. For a discussion of the eﬀects of diﬀerent industry structures, refer to Bjorvatn
and Eckel (2006).
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w = pixi + zi (with pi denoting the price of x in market i), one obtains
XA =
n(α− pA)
β
; XB =
(1− n)(α− pB)
β
, (2)
as A’s and B’s aggregate demand for x, respectively. Hence country A is the larger
market, as compared to B, if n > 0.5.
Following the related literature, we assume that, for the set-up of the new plant, the ﬁrm
incurs a ﬁxed cost which is suﬃciently large to prevent production at both locations. Our
set-up thus corresponds to a model of export-platform FDI. Note that serving several
countries from one location seems a suitable assumption in the European setting.
Suppose now that there is a sector-speciﬁc union in country A, but not in country B,
which sets an exogenous wage wA above the competitive one (which prevails in its z
industry), wA > wB = 1.
3 Let subscripts indicate the country to which terms refer and
let superscripts denote f ’s location decision. If f goes to A, then its proﬁts are
πA =
n (α− wA)2
4β
+
(1− n) (α− τ − wA)2
4β
, (3)
with the ﬁrst term representing market A and the second one market B proﬁts. Since
the quantity sent to country B amounts to (1− n)(α− τ − wA)/(2β), imposing strictly
positive exports yields a prohibitive level of trade costs of τ proh = (α − wA). Consumer
surplus in countries A and B is given by
CSAA =
n (α− wA)2
8β
; CSAB =
(1− n)(α− τ − wA)2
8β
. (4)
Analogous expressions for proﬁts and consumer surplus hold if f goes to B.
For country A, besides increased consumer surplus because of lower prices, attracting the
3Alternatively, we could have used a higher labor input requirement in A (i.e., lower manufacturing
productivity) to model a unit labor cost diﬀerential. Labor cost diﬀerentials have not been analyzed
before in this class of models. Barros and Cabral (2000), in an otherwise similar analysis, have considered
diﬀering shadow prices of labor (but equal wages) across countries, whereas mobile capital faces a labor
cost diﬀerential in our case. Apart from that, in their paper, production (rather than entry) is subsidized.
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outside ﬁrm has the advantage of a higher manufacturing wage income which is partially
borne by foreign consumers. Assuming that f ’s after-tax proﬁts are fully repatriated,4
and that tax receipts are redistributed to residents, welfare WA is composed of consumer
surplus, tax receipts and the ‘extra wage’ earned in the x industry.5 With f choosing the
location where after-tax proﬁts are highest, welfare-maximizing governments will engage
in a bidding race for the outside ﬁrm. A’s gross gain, before taxes or subsidies, from
attracting f is the welfare diﬀerence between the outcome with f located in A and the
one with f located in B,
ΔA = W
A
A −WBA = CSAA − CSBA + (wA − 1)
α− wA − (1− n)τ
2β
. (5)
Observe that a country’s welfare gain equals its willingness to pay for the investment: If
W ii > W
j
i , country i will be prepared to oﬀer a subsidy. Comparing ΔA and ΔB at the
benchmark case of size symmetry yields
ΔA −ΔB = (2α− 3wA − τ + 1)(wA − 1)
8β
, (6)
which is positive at 1 < wA < (2α− τ +1)/3. This reveals that, as long as wA is not ‘too
large’, A will have the stronger incentive to attract f , translating into a lower minimum
tax (higher maximum subsidy) it will be prepared to oﬀer.6 In what follows, we focus on
the situation where the high-wage country is willing to oﬀer a lower tax, i.e. when the
distortion resulting from production taking place in the high-wage location is not too
pronounced.
Having discussed a country’s willingness to pay for the investment, we next have to de-
termine what it will actually have to oﬀer in equilibrium in order to win the investment.
4This assumption is not critical for our results. We refer the interested reader to Ferrett and
Wooton (2010b) who show that the equilibrium tax/subsidy oﬀers are independent of the international
distribution of the mobile ﬁrm’s ownership.
5The latter could alternatively be interpreted as the employment gain in a country with unemploy-
ment where the shadow price of labor is lower than the nominal wage.
6If the wage diﬀerential exceeds the abovementioned threshold, the resulting distortion, i.e. the
reduction in consumer surplus due to the increase in the price of x, will become so large that A would
be worse oﬀ when hosting f compared to the ﬁrm going to B.
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It is straightforward to determine those ‘minimum winning bids’. Each country antici-
pates the maximum oﬀer of the other country which it must outbid, i.e. it has to bid the
rival’s gross gain. On top of that, so as to (just) win the race, country i has to oﬀer f
the proﬁt diﬀerential of what it would earn locating in j, net of what it can earn in i.
The minimum winning bid for A is thus
OA = π
B−πA+WBB −WAB =
(2α− τ − wA − 1)((3− n)wA + n− (5n− 3)τ − 3)
8β
. (7)
This expression is increasing in wA, implying a higher subsidy if the wage diﬀerential
gets larger. It also has the intuitive property of falling in n, reﬂecting the fact that with
positive trade costs, it will be the more costly for A to attract the ﬁrm the smaller is its
market. It is immediately obvious that due to its cost disadvantage, A will not be able to
attract the mobile ﬁrm if it has the additional drawback of oﬀering the smaller market.
We therefore focus, much like Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), on the non-trivial case where
A has the larger market, i.e., 0.5 < n < 1.
Now, to complete the argument, note that only if ΔA > OA, country A actually wants
to attract the investment. Setting ΔA equal to OA and solving for τ , we get a critical
level of trade costs above which country A will win the investment. This is
τ cr =
1
6
(6α− wA − 5) + wA − 1
6(2n− 1) −
δ
3(2n− 1) , (8)
with δ ≡
√
(3α− n(6α− 5)− (1− n)wA − 2)2 − 3(2n− 1) (wA − 1) (2α + wA − 3).7 Ob-
serve that this suﬃces to show that B does not want to attract the investment: The
diﬀerence in f ’s proﬁts, πi − πj, equals Δj − Oi = Oj − Δi.8 The intuition why lower
7This latter term’s sign is ambiguous because of the square root. However, it is easy to see that the
positive root is the relevant one: Adding the ﬁrst two terms in (8), one obtains an expression that is
larger than tproh. For trade to be viable, therefore, the last term must be positive.
8For the proof that country A will in fact win if trade costs exceed τ cr-line, notice that
∂(ΔA −OA)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τ=τcr
=
δ
4β
> 0.
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trade costs make it less likely for A to win the investment is straightforward: Only if
markets are suﬃciently separated, a diﬀerence in market size can have the potential to
make entering the high-cost country a proﬁtable option for the foreign ﬁrm. This, in
turn, makes it easier for the high-cost country to attract the investment.
So far the analysis has shown the regime border between the international ﬁrm going to A
or B, respectively. In order to be able to infer the diﬀerential impact of tax competition
on the outcome, we have to compare these results to the outcome that would prevail if
taxes/subsidies could not be used by governments. The analogous critical value of trade
costs above which the ﬁrm goes to A in the absence of tax policy (obtained from solving
πA = πB for τ) equals
τ 0 = (wA − 1)/(2n− 1). (9)
Conﬁrming our restriction to cases where 0.5 < n < 1 from above, we ﬁnd from (8) and
(9) that for 0 < n ≤ 0.5, there are no non-prohibitive τ cr > 0 or τ 0 > 0 permitting A to
attract f . For 0.5 < n < 1, however, the critical level of trade costs τ cr in the subsidy
race is strictly smaller than the one that would prevail without subsidies. In between
those two trade cost levels, tax policy leads to the mobile ﬁrm’s settling in country A,
in spite of the higher cost, while it would go to B in the absence of tax competition.9
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect in (n, τ) - space: The dashed line displays the regime border
between A (above) and B (below) winning, respectively, with subsidies. The solid line
is the regime border that would prevail if the use of policy instruments was ruled out.
As is typical for a bidding race, we get subsidies in equilibrium in a large range of the
9The algebraic demonstration that τ cr < τ0 is as follows: Setting τ cr equal to τ0, and solving, e.g.,
for α, one obtains
α =
n (wA + 1)− 1
2n− 1 .
Now, α equaling (n (wA + 1) − 1)/(2n − 1) is inconsistent with τ = τ0 = (wA − 1)/(2n − 1) lying in
between 0 and τproh = α−wA, and wA > wB = 1 while n > 0. Having shown that τ cr = τ0 and noting
that the two are continuous, plugging in any values demonstrates that τ cr < τ0.
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parameter space. However, upon examination of OA from (7), it is easy to see that if
the high-wage country is large enough and trade costs are above a certain level, A will
even be able to charge a tax in equilibrium despite its higher labor costs. This occurs
in the northeast of the parameter space of Figure 2. Hence, tax policy gives a country
both the opportunity and the incentive to attract investment where it otherwise would
not (due to its relatively disadvantageous position in terms of labor costs).
Figure 2 about here
3 Evidence
3.1 Estimation approach
The model from Section 2 implies that it may be optimal for governments to compensate
ﬁrms for international labor cost diﬀerentials, and that, for moderate labor cost diﬀer-
entials, the level of business taxes should negatively depend on a country’s level of labor
costs relative to that of its competitors for FDI. In the following, we test this implica-
tion empirically. For this purpose we use an unbalanced panel of 16 western European
countries for the period from 1982 to 2005.10 While it would be desirable to use the
level of direct subsidies to ﬁrms as the dependent variable, this is impossible for a very
practical reason: comprehensive information on the level of such subsidies is unavailable.
We therefore employ as our dependent variable the statutory corporate income tax rate.
This may actually be seen as an advantage over using subsidies because the tax rate
is a fairly broad measure for the attractiveness of locations for private investment. In
particular, the corporate income tax rate is relevant even for smaller ﬁrms that often do
not have the bargaining power to obtain sizable subsidies. We also expect the statutory
tax rate to be less aﬀected by the business cycle and other temporary country-speciﬁc
10The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
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eﬀects that are diﬃcult to control for in an empirical analysis.
In order to provide us with a test of the hypothesis delineated from the theoretical model,
the empirical model relates the corporate income tax rate to the labor cost diﬀerential
plus controls. Assuming a linear relation between taxes and labor costs, our estimation
equation reads
TAXit = αΔLCit +Xitβ + γt + ci + it, i = 1 . . . , N, t = 1982, . . . , 2005, (10)
where TAXit represents the corporate income tax rate, ΔLCit is the labor cost diﬀeren-
tial, Xit is a vector of controls, ci denotes country-speciﬁc and γt period-speciﬁc eﬀects.
From the theoretical model we expect a negative α, indicating that countries with less
competitive labor costs tend to set lower tax rates.
The labor cost diﬀerential is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a country’s own labor cost
and that of a predeﬁned composite neighbor, ΔLCit = LCit−
∑
j wijLCjt. The composite
neighbor is constructed using weights of competitors wij which are based on geographical
distance, dij, and population, popi. More precisely, these weights are determined as
wij =
ln(popj)/d
2
ij∑
k =i ln(popk)/d
2
ik
for j = i and wij = 0 for j = i. Using the squared inverse
distance is motivated by the notion that geography matters for the investment decisions of
multinational ﬁrms. In particular, we refer to the evidence on a negative eﬀect of distance
on FDI ﬂows (Carr et al., 2001). Similarly, geographical distance drives transportation
costs for produced goods but also information costs (Portes and Rey, 2005). Inﬂating
the weights by population (in logs) reﬂects the fact that competing locations with larger
markets (all other things equal) should be more relevant in determining the relative
position of a given country than competitors with small markets. One could argue
that GDP would be a better proxy for market size, but a possible interdependence
between TAXi and other countries’ GDP induced by ﬁscal externalities would burden
the estimation of the model parameters with an additional endogeneity problem that
would be diﬃcult to cope with. We therefore prefer to use population in the weight
formula because it can plausibly be treated as exogenous to the model.
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Note that the weights are normalized such that
∑
j wij = 1 ∀i. This facilitates the
interpretation of α, for the labor cost diﬀerential is simply the diﬀerence between a
country’s own labor cost and the weighted average of costs in competing countries. As the
weights have to be imposed on the model and cannot be tested for their appropriateness,
we report several robustness tests using alternative weight schemes in the results section.
As regards the choice of an estimator for model (10), it is clear that naive OLS estimates
of the model parameters will generally be uninformative. This is because there are at
least two reasons to believe that causality runs not only from wages to the tax rate,
but also from the tax rate to the wage level. First, as shown by Devereux and Griﬃth
(1998) and Bu¨ttner and Ruf (2007), the corporate income tax is one of the determinants
of investment. Consequently, labor market conditions must be assumed to depend on
a country’s attractiveness for private investment and, therefore, tax policies. Second,
a recent literature argues that ﬁrms can shift part of the burden of a corporate tax
onto labor in the form of lower real wages (Hassett and Mathur, 2006; Felix, 2007;
Arulampalam et al., 2007; Desai et al., 2007, Felix and Hines, 2009).
If the tax rate and the wage level relative to other countries are jointly determined
variables, LCit and it will be correlated, which renders OLS estimates inconsistent.
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We therefore treat the labor cost diﬀerential as an endogenous regressor and devise an
instrumental variable (IV) approach to obtain consistent estimates for α. Our IV exploits
the breakdown of the communist regimes in eastern Europe around 1989/90 as a source
of exogenous variation in labor cost diﬀerentials. More speciﬁcally, we construct and use
as an IV an indicator measuring the geographical exposure of the diﬀerent locations in
western Europe to the economic shock that was implied by the 1989 revolution and the
subsequent integration between western and eastern Europe. The indicator is constructed
as follows. Based on the count of the number of countries one has to drive through (or
to ﬂy over in case of no land connection) starting from j’s capital and heading at the
11As both arguments in favor of reversed causality (from the corporate tax to wages) imply a negative
relation between the tax rate and the wage level, we have no strong prior about the direction of the bias
when estimating α from naive OLS regressions.
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closest eastern European capital, DIST EASTj,
12 we construct the IV as
∑
j wij(5 −
DIST EASTj)× (2006− t)×D1990, where D1990 is a dummy for post-1989 years.13
Note that the IV captures variation in ΔLCit driven by diﬀerences between countries
in terms of their exposure to countries in eastern Europe with initially low (and then
slowly increasing) relative labor costs. How the instrument captures exogenous variation
in labor cost diﬀerentials can best be understood by looking at two countries like Austria
and France. While Austria had a wage level similar to that of most of its (western
European) competitors before 1989, it suddenly became a high-wage location relative
to its neighbors after 1989: due to its geographical location close to countries like the
Czech and Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia, its labor cost diﬀerential
experienced a signiﬁcant jump when all these low-wage countries became new competitors
for FDI. The instrument
∑
j wij(5 − DIST EASTj) × (2006 − t) × D1990 captures this
shock because the average distance to eastern Europe of Austria’s neighbors is small. In
contrast, France is a country that, due to its geographical position, was much less exposed
to the integration shock. Figure 3 illustrates this point and the rationale for the choice of
the instrument by jointly showing the labor cost diﬀerential and the instrument for both
countries. By construction of the instrument, we expect it to be positively correlated
with the labor cost diﬀerential, an assumption that will be conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst-stage
regressions reported below.
Figure 3 about here
To ensure the validity of our IV we need to account for the direct eﬀect of the 1989/90
break on taxes. We do this by including as an ordinary regressor an indicator equal
to (5 − DIST EASTi) × (1989 − t) × D1990. Note that, in contrast to our IV, (5 −
DIST EASTi) × (1989 − t) × D1990 does not show a discrete jump in 1990, reﬂecting
the fact that the economic integration between East and West was a gradual process
12Counting both i and the country of the closest eastern European capital, this gives, for instance, a
value of one for Poland, two for Germany, three for France, and four for the UK.
13Using (5−DIST EASTi)× (2006− t)×D1990 as IV gives similar, but statistically less signiﬁcant
results.
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rather than an immediate result of the 1989/90 revolution. As an alternative, we use the
indicator BORDERi × (1989 − t) × D1990, where BORDERi is a dummy for western
European countries with immediate eastern European neighbors.14 Note also that using
the integration shock to identify the impact of labor cost diﬀerentials implies that only
western European countries can be used for estimation. However, the available data on
eastern Europe is used to compute ΔLCit.
To estimate Equation (10), we use the statutory corporate income tax rate15 together
with a compensation cost index (U.S.=100) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS), comprising hourly compensation costs in manufacturing with a compensation
cost index (USA=100). These are prepared by the BLS speciﬁcally in order to assess
international diﬀerences in employer labor costs. The measure includes hourly direct pay
and employer social insurance expenditures and other labor taxes. The exchange rates
used are prevailing commercial market exchange rates. In addition, we use unit labor
costs in manufacturing, representing the current cost of labor per ‘real quantity unit’ of
output produced, taken from the ILO’s ‘Key Indicators of the Labor Market’ database.
This indicator represents a direct link between productivity and the cost of labor used
in generating output, and it is speciﬁcally designed as an indicator of countries’ cost
competitiveness.
As regards the control variables, we follow the literature on the determinants of corporate
tax rates and include country size (GDP or population in logs), and a measure for
openness (share of exports and imports in GDP). We also control for preferences for
public expenditures (percentage of population below 15 and above 65 years).16 A further
variable that needs to be considered is the personal income tax. Slemrod (2004) has
argued that an increasing gap between personal and corporate income taxes may lead
to an incentive to defer taxes by means of excessive retention of capital income at the
14The group comprises Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden.
15We would like to thank Michael Overesch (ZEW Mannheim) for generously sharing his tax data
with us.
16Data sources for the control variables are Eurostat and the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank.
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corporate level. The corporate income tax may therefore serve as a backstop for the
personal income tax. Indeed, Slemrod (2004) (and a number of more recent studies
cited in the introduction) have found the top personal income tax rate to be positively
correlated with the corporate income tax. Although Slemrod’s argument is compelling,
we are somewhat reluctant to treat the top personal income tax as a control variable, for
the point to include it among the regressors also suggests it to be jointly determined with
the corporate income tax. However, without a convincing instrument for the personal
income tax in sight, treating it as an endogenous regressor is a serious complication. In
light of these diﬃculties, we prefer to omit the top personal income tax rate from our
baseline regressions. We then check the robustness of our ﬁndings by including it as an
ordinary regressor.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. We note that the key variables are characterized
by substantial variation. The statutory tax ranges from 0.125 (Ireland, 2003-05) to 0.67
(Sweden, 1982-83). The compensation cost diﬀerential varies from values below -50 in
Portugal throughout the 1990s and 2000s and values above 90 in Austria and Germany
in the mid 1990s. The maximum compensation cost diﬀerential in the sample thus comes
close to the absolute level of compensation costs in the U.S. (recall that the compensation
cost index is indexed by the value 100 for the U.S. in all years). The unit labor cost
diﬀerential also varies substantially, showing values below -0.5 in Ireland in the mid 2000s
and values above 0.5 in Austria (mid 1990s) and Norway (mid 2000s). Note that due to
missing data for labor costs in eastern Europe prior to 1993, we do not make use of the
cross-sections 1990-1992.
Table 1 about here
3.2 Results
In presenting the results of our empirical analysis, we will proceed in three steps. First,
we will brieﬂy discuss simple OLS estimations which ignore the likely endogeneity of
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the wage diﬀerential. Second, we will present the 2SLS estimation results for a number
of baseline estimations. Third, we will report on some robustness checks of our main
ﬁndings.
Let us ﬁrst turn to the OLS estimations, assembled in Table 2. Columns (1) to (3) report
estimations using the compensation cost diﬀerential as our main explanatory variable.
In columns (1) and (2) we check whether measuring country size by GDP or population
makes any diﬀerence, but the coeﬃcient of the labor cost diﬀerential turns out to be
insigniﬁcant in both regressions. In column (3) we use the top personal income tax rate
as an additional regressor. We now obtain a weakly signiﬁcant (10% level) negative eﬀect
of the labor cost diﬀerential. Among the controls, we ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient for GDP
(in logs), conﬁrming the result familiar from other studies that larger economies tend
to set higher corporate tax rates. Moreover, the estimations point to a positive partial
correlation between the statutory tax rates and the percentage of elderly people as our
proxy for the demand for public services and welfare, and the top personal income tax
rate. Finally, the results suggest that more open economies have lower tax rates. While
all these ﬁndings are well in line with previous studies, our results regarding the role
of relative labor costs are inconclusive. Turning to the estimations using the unit labor
costs instead of compensation costs to measure the relative cost of labor in columns (4)
to (6), we ﬁnd the results for the control variables conﬁrmed. However, the coeﬃcients
for the unit labor cost diﬀerential is insigniﬁcant across all estimations.
Table 2 about here
The next step is to see whether accounting for the likely endogeneity of the labor cost
diﬀerential makes any diﬀerence. Before turning to the main results it is instructive
to have a brief look at the ﬁrst-stage regression outcomes, displayed in Table 3. The
ﬁrst three columns report ﬁrst-stage regressions for the compensation cost diﬀerential.
Irrespective of whether and how we control for a possible direct eﬀect of the integration
shock on tax rates (coeﬃcients of remaining control variables not reported), we ﬁnd a
strong positive partial correlation between the compensation cost diﬀerential and the
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instrument,
∑
j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006− t)×D1990. Hence, the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sions support the logic of the instrumental variable’s design. It is also worth noting that
the diagnostic statistics regarding the strength of the instrument are quite impressive,
with partial values of the R2 between 0.31 and 0.37 and F -statistics of the IV between
19.8 and 30.6. Columns (4) to (6) show the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the unit labor cost
diﬀerential. Again we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant positive partial correlation between the
diﬀerential and the instrument. While the diagnostic statistics are weaker than in the
regressions for the compensation cost diﬀerential, they still signal that we do not have
to worry about problems of weak identiﬁcation. Taken together, the ﬁrst-stage results
lend strong support to our instruments.
Table 3 about here
Having conﬁrmed that the instrument provides suﬃcient variation to identify the eﬀect
of the labor cost diﬀerential on tax rates (assuming that the instrument is exogenous),
we can now turn to the results for the main regression. Table 4 displays results of a set
of baseline two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations accounting for the endogeneity of
labor cost diﬀerentials.17 Columns (1) to (3) use the compensation cost diﬀerential as
the key explanatory variable. Irrespective of whether and how we control for the direct
eﬀect of the 1989/90 shock on tax policies, the estimates point to a statistically signiﬁcant
impact of labor cost diﬀerentials on tax rates. As suggested by the theoretical model, the
estimated eﬀect is negative, meaning that countries with relatively high labor costs tend
to set lower corporate income tax rates. But the estimated eﬀects are also economically
signiﬁcant: If the compensation cost diﬀerential increases by one percent of the current
compensation cost in the U.S., ﬁrms are, on average, compensated by a 0.19 percentage
point cut in the tax rate. A one-standard deviation increase in the compensation cost
diﬀerential thus triggers a 5.1 percentage point cut in taxes. Among the control variables,
we conﬁrm the familiar result that bigger and more economically closed countries have
higher corporate taxes. Moreover, the results point to the percentage of elderly people
17Due to the limited number of cross-sectional observations, we report standard errors which are
robust to clustering by country within four-year windows.
17
and the associated need for social services to be positively correlated with taxes.
Table 4 about here
If we take into account diﬀerences in labor productivity we ﬁnd similar eﬀects. As
shown in columns (4) to (6), a one-standard deviation increase in the unit labor cost
diﬀerential is estimated to decrease the statutory tax rate by 7.3 to 7.5 percentage points.
It is reassuring to see that the eﬀect of labor costs on taxes is stronger when productivity
diﬀerences are taken into account, for simple labor cost diﬀerentials should partly reﬂect
cross-country diﬀerences in labor productivity.
Table 5 is devoted to a number of robustness checks of our main ﬁndings. For brevity, we
only display results for estimations using unit labor costs to deﬁne the key explanatory
variable. Similarly, we use (5 − DIST EASTi) × (1989 − t) × D1990 to account for the
direct eﬀect of the integration shock on taxes in all regressions reported. Hence, the
point of reference for all estimations in Table 5 is column (5) from Table 4. Column
(1) reports a 2SLS estimation where we account for market size by population (in logs)
instead of GDP. The coeﬃcient of the unit labor cost diﬀerential is still signiﬁcant at
the ﬁve percent level and very close to the one obtained using log(GDP). Column (2)
adds the top personal income tax rate. The eﬀect of the labor cost diﬀerential is now
somewhat smaller, but still very close to the value obtained before. We conclude that
potential endogeneity problems associated with using GDP and the top personal income
tax rate as explanatory variables are of no practical importance for our study.
Table 5 about here
The remaining columns report robustness checks with respect to the weight matrix that
we have to impose in order to be able to derive the labor cost diﬀerential. First, we display
an estimation where the cost diﬀerential (together with the instrument) has been derived
using wij = ln(popj)/dij to compute the weights.
18 Hence, in contrast to the estimations
18Note that, as before, we standardize the weights such that
∑
j wij = 1 ∀i before computing the
average labor cost of competitors.
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in Table 4 and those reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, we employ a weaker
form of distance decay. We note that the coeﬃcient of the labor cost diﬀerential is
now signiﬁcantly larger. At the same time, it is estimated with much less precision.
The result that weights with an insuﬃcient degree of distance decay produce imprecise
coeﬃcient estimates in panel applications is familiar from the applied literature dealing
with cross-sectional dependence.19 The problem can best be understood by considering
the extreme case with no distance decay at all. Using wij = ln(popj), for instance, would
provide us with a measure for neighbors’ labor costs at time t,
∑N
j=1wijLCjt, that does
not vary across i for N → ∞. In a ﬁnite sample, the labor cost diﬀerential would thus
boil down to a country’s own cost, minus a variable that, for increasing N , approaches a
period-speciﬁc constant equal to the average labor costs of all countries in the sample. As
a consequence, we could no longer identify the labor cost diﬀerential in our estimations.
Noting that our instrument is also based on the weights, it seems natural that 2SLS
estimates with insuﬃcient distance decay tend to be imprecise. This notion is supported
by the diagnostic statistics reported at the bottom of Table 5. Both the partial R2 and
the F -statistic of the instrument decrease considerably once we employ weights based on
ln(popj)/dij.
Turning to column (4) we note that, while a suﬃcient degree of distance decay is es-
sential for our purpose, the adjustment of weights according to population is not. With
weight scheme wij = 1/d
2
ij , we obtain results which are again very similar to those from
the ﬁrst two columns. In accordance with the discussion of the role of distance decay
for identiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the diagnostic statistics indicate the presence of a strong
instrument. Finally, column (5) presents an estimation using weights based on simple
inverse distance, wij = 1/dij . The outcome conﬁrms our previous ﬁnding that insuﬃ-
cient distance decay gives rise to an imprecise estimate of α and a performance of the
instrument which is not satisfactory according to all established standards.
Finally, columns (6) and (7) test for robustness regarding the speciﬁcation of the in-
19For a more detailed discussion in a related context, we refer the reader to Overesch and Rincke
(2010).
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strumental variable. As an alternative to the speciﬁcation used so far, one might think
of using only variation in labor cost diﬀerentials for identiﬁcation that is related to the
diﬀerence in terms of exposure to the integration shock between border and non-border
countries. The most straightforward way to capture this variation is to use as an in-
strumental variable the interaction between BORDERi and the indicator for post-shock
years, D1990. Column (6) shows the outcome of the 2SLS procedure when using weights
based on ln(popj)/d
2
ij, while column (7) uses weights derived from 1/d
2
ij . The results con-
ﬁrm the negative impact of the unit labor cost diﬀerential on the tax rate at the ﬁve per-
cent level of signiﬁcance. We also note, however, that the point estimates are higher com-
pared to the reference estimation from Table 4, column (5), and signiﬁcantly less precise.
Furthermore, the F -statistic of the IV indicates that BORDERi×D1990 is not as strong
a predictor of the labor cost diﬀerential as
∑
j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006−t)×D1990.
We conclude that estimations exploiting for identiﬁcation only the diﬀerence in exposure
to the integration shock between border and non-border countries generally support the
ﬁndings obtained using the more elaborate instrumental variable, but that accounting for
the diﬀerences between western European countries in terms of their geographical posi-
tion relative to eastern Europe in a more ﬂexible way signiﬁcantly improves the precision
of our estimates.
4 Discussion
We have developed a simple model highlighting the behavior of governments in a bidding
race for FDI when countries diﬀer in labor costs. The key insight from the model is that
governments of high-wage countries tend to set tax policies which are more favorable
for ﬁrms than policies chosen by low-wage countries. Hence, the model lends support
to the notion that diﬀerences in corporate income tax policies can at least partly be ex-
plained as government policies devised to compensate ﬁrms for international labor cost
diﬀerentials. We have then put the model prediction to an empirical test. Using data
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on western Europe, we have estimated a substantial eﬀect of labor cost diﬀerentials on
corporate tax rates, conﬁrming the model prediction. Our results are in line with prelim-
inary ﬁndings discussed by Overesch and Rincke (2009), who analyze the tax response
of western European countries to the breakdown of communism in 1989 and come to
the conclusion that wage diﬀerentials are a more plausible driving force (compared to
strategic competition in tax rates) for the signiﬁcant tax cuts in those western European
countries located geographically close to eastern Europe.
Testing the hypothesis of governments compensating ﬁrms for wage diﬀerentials with
European data covering the 1989/90 break is advantageous because the breakdown of
communism in eastern Europe lends itself as a credible source of exogenous variation
in wage diﬀerentials. However, it also carries a limitation because the cross-sectional
dimension of the data set is rather small. An obvious alternative would be to consider
the U.S. states, where data availability is less of an issue.20 We experimented with
U.S. data, but could not come up with conclusive results. This might have to do with
the fact that the variation in tax rates over time in the U.S. is very limited for most states,
and that it is diﬃcult to identify a source of exogenous variation that can be exploited
to construct instrumental variables. We experimented with data on unionization and
other labor market institutions, but the problem of limited variation over time appeared
to be present here, too. Hence, although the cross-sectional variation is very limited in
our application, it seems that coming up with more promising data is not at all an easy
task.
The policy conclusion of our analysis is that if labor unions are successful in setting wages
above the competitive level, this may not only cause unemployment, but also force the
government to compensate ﬁrms by reducing corporate income taxes. Hence, unions
which are successful in the sense that they manage to implement a
high wage level will perhaps also trigger tax policies which unionists often characterize
20For an analysis of recently compiled data on state investment tax incentives and their eﬀect on
capital formation, see Chinn and Ito (2008).
21
as favoring the interests of ‘capital’ over those of ‘labor’.
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Figure 1: Average statutory tax rates for diﬀerent European regions over time
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Figure 3: Compensation cost diﬀerential and instrument for Austria and France
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Compensation cost diﬀerential deﬁned as a country’s own labor cost minus that of neighbors,
ΔLCit = LCit−
∑
j wijLCjt. Instrument deﬁned as
∑
j wij(5−DIST EASTj)×(2006−t)×D1990.
See text for details.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate 0.393 0.102 0.125 0.659
Compensation cost diﬀerential a 5.79 27.1 -56.8 96.9
Unit labor cost diﬀerential a 0.031 0.165 -0.527 0.541
Log(GDP) 12.2 1.34 8.22 14.5
Log(Population) 9.37 1.37 5.90 11.3
Openness 0.870 0.510 0.366 2.89
% young 0.183 0.026 0.139 0.303
% old 0.149 0.018 0.105 0.197
Top personal income tax rate 0.547 0.102 0.390 0.870
(5−DIST EAST )× (1989− t)×D1990 -14.1 14.6 -48.0 0
BORDER× (1989− t)×D1990 -2.09 3.80 -13.0 0∑
j wij(5−DIST EASTj)× (2006− t)×D1990 a 11.4 11.4 0 46.1
Unbalanced panel (16 countries, years 1982-1989 and 1993-2005, 304 observations).
a Competitors’ weights based on squared inverse distance and population (in logs).
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